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Introduction
A topical issue throughout the euro crisis has been central banks' Target balances, "an accounting system hidden in remote corners of the balance sheets of Eurozone's National Central Banks" (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012: 468) . "Target" have largely created and lent money to finance balance-of-payments deficits, while money creation and lending in the core of the Eurozone has decreased. The Eurozone's stock of net refinancing credit moved from the European core countries to the GIIPS countries. The reallocation of refinancing credit describes a public capital flow via the ECB system and can be interpreted as the first euro rescue program (Sinn 2012a , Sinn 2014 , Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012 . 4 Hans-Werner Sinn first drew attention to the increasing Target imbalances in the Eurozone in spring 2011 and has since explored why Target imbalances threaten financial stability (see, e.g., Sinn 2012a). In February 2012, Jens Weidmann, the president of the German Bundesbank, described his concerns about the Target imbalances to Mario Draghi, the president of the ECB, and called for a collateralization of the German Target claims. euros. If the Eurozone collapsed, the German Bundesbank's basis for these claims would 3 Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer. 4 Steinkamp and Westermann (2012) describe the Target liabilities of the national central banks as senior lending by the markets similar to the rescue packages from the IMF and the EU (e.g., EFSM/ESM). 5 See Ruhkamp (2012) . disappear, and the German Bundesbank would probably sustain a loss. Given that the German Bundesbank would request a recapitalization, it is conceivable that the German federal government would have to increase taxes or decrease public pensions to finance the Bundesbank's loss. Alternatively, German government debt would increase (Sinn 2012a (Sinn , 2012b (Sinn , 2013 . Target balances are thus part of the hidden government debt.
Scholars have investigated whether governments pursue sustainable fiscal policies by testing for stationarity of the real debt level or the debt-to-GDP ratio (e.g., Hamilton and Flavin 1986 , Kremers 1988 , Wilcox 1989 When the real debt level or the debt-to-GDP ratio contains a unit root, and is thus shown to be nonstationary, experts describe fiscal policies as unsustainable. Scholars also use unit root tests to examine the sustainability of external debt and current account deficits (e.g., Wickens and Uctum 1993) . Sustainablity tests have as yet ignored hidden government debt such as the Target balances. Phillips et al. (2011) have introduced a new recursive unit root test on explosive behaviour, especially to identify asset price bubbles. 7 We use the recursive unit root test by Phillips et al. (2011) to investigate whether the Target balances of the German Bundesbank are explosive. 8 We identify explosive periods in the German Target balance and discuss the events that induced the exploding Target balances. As a robustness test we also employ the new unit root test to identify multiple explosive periods by Phillips et al (2013) .
Hidden debt
Many studies elaborating on government debt and fiscal sustainability deal with noncontingent explicit debt, i.e. obligations that are based on a particular law or contract and must be served in any event, as recorded in the government's accounting system. But governments also have implicit liabilities, i.e. "moral" payment obligations of the government, which arise as a result of public expectations, pressure from interest groups and the role of the state in the society (Polackova 1998 The Target claims are an implicit liability because the German government would have the "moral" obligation to recapitalize the German Bundesbank in 9 De Grauwe and Ji (2012) do not believe that the German Bundesbank will experience a loss if the Target debtor countries do not repay their Target liabilities. De Grauwe and Ji (2012) argue that all money in the Eurozone is fiat money, which has a value independent of the corresponding national central bank's assets. In contrast, Sinn (2012b Sinn ( , 2013 maintains that the Target claims do indeed pose a financial risk to the German Bundesbank.
case of a loss of the Target claims (Sinn 2013, Kooths and van Roye 2012) . Against the background of the large German Target claims, it is conceivable that German government debt would increase (Sinn 2012a (Sinn , 2012b (Sinn , 2013 . 
Data
We use monthly data on the German Target balance compiled by the Ifo Institute. We deflate the nominal values by using the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) of the Eurozone. Figure 1 shows the real German Target the Target claims have gradually declined following Mario Draghi's announcement that "the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro" (ECB 2012) and the ECB had started to implement new measures to support troubled Eurozone countries (Cour-Thimann 10 In July 2012 the rating agency Moody's emphasized the contingent liabilities from the Target claims of the German Bundesbank when considering a downgrading of Germany: "The second and interrelated driver of the change in outlook to negative is the increase in contingent liabilities that is associated with even the most benign scenario of a continuation of European leaders' reactive and gradualist approach to policymaking. […] As the largest euro area country, Germany bears a significant share of these contingent liabilities. The contingent liabilities stem from bilateral loans, the EFSF, the European Central Bank (ECB) via the holdings in the Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the Target 2 balances, and -once established -the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)" (Moody's 2012 
Empirical analysis

Empirical specification
We employ the recursive unit root test proposed by Phillips et al. (2011) 
11 Homm and Breitung (2012) evaluate alternative tests for explosive behaviour and show that the PWY test is suitable to investigate explosive behaviour. Homm and Breitung (2012) also show that the PWY test is more robust against multiple breaks than the other tests considered. On the size and power properties of the PWY test, see Phillips et al. (2014) .
where denotes the real Target balance in period t, is an intercept, describes an error term, and k is the lag order. We follow Phillips et al. (2011) and do not include a time trend.
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In our baseline model, we estimate equation (1) recursively by gradually enlarging the subsamples with one additional observation. r describes the fraction of the total number of observations T we use in each subsample. In the first subsample we employ a fraction 0.2 of the total number of observations T=183. The window size of the subsamples expands from to 1. thus describes the first subsample (37 observations) and 1 describes the total sample (183 observations). We fix the starting point of each subsample at 0, so that the end point of each subsample equals and changes from to 1 (see Phillips et al. 2013) . From equation (1) we obtain the ADF test statistic . is the maximum of over , 1 .
We test : 1 against the explosive alternative : 1. We reject when the test statistic is larger than the right-tailed critical values provided by Phillips et al. (2014) . To select the optimum lag length we use a sequential testing procedure as proposed by Campbell and Perron (1991) . Starting with ten lags we exclude lags that do not turn out to be statistically significant until the last included lag is significant at the 5% level and obtain an optimum lag length of four.
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In our baseline specification we use the same lag length for each 12 Phillips et al. (2014: 319) explain: "The empirical regression of the right-tailed unit root test given in Diba and Grossman (1988) is R2 [including a constant and a trend]. This regression has both a constant as well as a deterministic trend. Since the presence of either of these two terms is empirically unrealistic when ρ>1, regression R2 is not suitable for right-tailed unit root testing. By contrast, regression R1 [including a constant and no trend] is empirically more realistic and PWY implemented a right-tailed unit root test using this regression formulation." 13 The Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion also select an optimum lag length of four. Ng and Perron (1995) show that the lag selection based on sequential tests has less size distortion and similar power compared to information-based rules.
subsample. Inferences do not change when we select the optimum lag length separately for each subsample. To determine when the real German Target balance became explosive we follow Target balance has not been explosive any more (see Figure 2 ).
Results
Robustness tests
We have also employed the PWY test using rolling regressions with a fixed window width.
We have run each regression on a subsample of 40% of the full sample (i.e., 73 observations) and with the initialization date rolling forward. The test based on forward rolling regressions indicates that the real German Target balance became explosive in December 2008.
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We also find explosive behaviour in the real German Target balance in December 2007. Using rolling regressions, we do not find explosive behaviour in the real German Target balance since January 2013 (see Figure 3) .
The PWY test is especially effective for time series with a single explosive period. If a time series includes more than one explosive period, the PWY test may fail to identify the existence of explosive periods (Phillips et al. 2013 ). To deal with multiple periods of exuberance, Phillips et al. (2013) propose a rolling window regression procedure (PSY test) which uses recursive right-tailed ADF tests with flexible window widths.
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The PSY test performs a SADF test on backwards expanding subsamples with the end point of each subsample fixed at and the start point varies from 0 to . The backward SADF statistic (BSADF) describes the maximum value of the ADF statistic over the interval from to .
To determine the explosive periods we compare the BSADF statistics with the critical values of the SADF test. We use the 95% SADF critical value sequence, which we obtained from 15 Alternatively we use moving subsamples of 30% and 50% of the whole sample (55 and 92 observations) and obtain very similar results (see also Table 2 ). 16 Etienne et al. (2014) apply the PSY test to identify price bubbles in agricultural futures markets.
Monte Carlo simulations with 2,000 replications (Phillips et al. 2013 ). show that the PWY test with increasing observations may fail to find explosive periods in samples with multiple explosive periods. Table 2 shows the explosive periods which we obtained in our different test procedures.
Conclusion
Using the new unit root tests by Phillips et al. (2011) In autumn 2007 the interbank market broke down for the first time, the first commercial banks (e.g., Northern Rock) began to teeter, and interbank risk premia for the GIIPS countries rose sharply. The German Target claims increased sharply because credit flows from the core Eurozone countries into the GIIPS countries decreased and the national central banks of the GIIPS countries had to create money to finance imports.
In October 2008 the ECB implemented a full-allotment policy to facilitate bank lending after the outbreak of the financial crisis and the collapse of the interbank market. The ECB provided any amount of credit to the commercial banks when the commercial banks were able to offer adequate collateral. The ECB also reduced the required minimum quality of collaterals from A-to BBB-in autumn 2008 to enable the commercial banks to use the full-allotment facility, undercutting market conditions.
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The commercial banks of the GIIPS countries used the extra refinancing credit to replace the flow of credit from abroad that had financed the current account deficits and to redeem their maturing stocks of interbank credit.
The net payment orders from the GIIPS countries to Germany that resulted from the extra refinancing credit induced the exploding Target balances (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012 , Sinn 2012a .
The real German Target claims have decreased since autumn 2012 because intergovernmental fiscal rescue credit was being paid out to the crisis countries and the OMT and the ESM had calmed the markets. Private capital flowed back into the crisis countries.
According to our findings the explosive period of the real German Target balance ended at the beginning of 2013.
One issue is whether the decreasing Target claims of the German Bundesbank and the decreasing Target liabilities of the GIIPS countries indicate that governments are pursuing sustainable fiscal policies. When the Target claims of the German Bundesbank decrease, German hidden government debt decreases. The decreasing Target liabilities of the GIIPS countries imply that capital is flowing back to the GIIPS countries. In Spain, however, the new capital was mainly invested in newly issued government bonds (Westermann 2013) .
Public debt in Spain increased (see Figure 5 ). Increasing public debt gives rise to new risks to fiscal sustainability in the GIIPS countries.
In March 2013, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund put together a rescue package for Cyprus. The rescue package included a levy on bank deposits. When creditors do not trust in bank deposits in the crisis countries, capital is likely to flee from the crisis countries, and the German Target claims are likely to increase (Boysen-Hogrefe 2013).
18 Since 2010 the ECB has even suspended a minimum credit rating for debt instruments issued or guaranteed by crisis countries (see Eberl and Weber 2014 
